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 Why did the Anthropologist Cross the Road: 
 On the Anthropology of Humor and Laughter 
 Think for a moment, back to one of the last times you laughed— laughed so hard that you 
cried, so hard that it hurt. It could have been something hilarious, or something small that you 
got carried away with. But regardless, this moment should be distinct in your memory; it could 
have changed what may have been a bad day into a better one, and it is possible that you had 
people giving you dirty looks because you were being so loud. But it is as possible that you had 
someone laughing just as hard right next to you. After all, we laugh the most when among 
friends. In any case, this moment should have been distinct enough in your memory that you 
recalled it the second I asked you to. These moments resonate with us deeply, and for good 
reason, as laughter is a powerful emotional response that we humans crave from one another.  
 Now think again, back to a time where you were told, for whatever reason, not to laugh. 
This is not uncommon in classrooms where unruly children laugh too loudly and too frequently 
for the teacher’s liking. She tells them to be quiet, or even to shut up. Or a parent or a friend 
scolded you for laughing at something, saying that “it’s not funny!” You wouldn’t be laughing if 
it wasn’t, but maybe it was in bad taste at least. You were laughing at something sensitive, or at 
someone you are expected to respect. Maybe you were laughing at the teacher that told you to 
shut up in the first place. Either way, these kinds of moments are formative for you as well, in 
that they have shaped your understanding of the time and place for humor, albeit through 
mechanisms of shame and humiliation.  
 But this is the paradox of laughter— that despite how much time and energy we commit 
to the pursuit of humor and joy that provokes this affective display, we are advised from an early 
age that there is a time and a place for this experience. To laugh too much, too loudly, or about 
the wrong thing is a kind of moral transgression. This ambivalence, I will argue, characterizes 
centuries of public and academic discourse about the role and place of laughter among western 
societies; to say that this is an area of contention between humorists and haters of laughter, so-
called misogelasts.  
Take for example the old maxim, “laughter is the best medicine.” What does that mean? 
Well, this opinion, that laughter is not only good, but even healthful, is a long-held conviction 
within the western world’s collective imaginary about laughter. However, this is not the full 
consensus of social thinkers and critics— many who speak in regard to laughter claim that 
laughter can be cruel, excessive, and even dangerous. If you laugh too much, you run the risk of 
not taking anything seriously. Further, if you cannot stop laughing, you are displaying symptoms 
of a potential psychological disorder. And if enough people can’t stop laughing, you have mass 
hysteria, a form of mass psychogenic illness. 
 These phenomena, among others, have become the focus of contemporary academic 
discussion of laughter. Laughter exists in a cross-liminal space in our biosocial imaginary: that 
is, as both a behavior and an expression, as good and bad, healthy or unhealthy, a huge amount 
of our social lives consists of the activity of laughter, for better or for worse. In this new era of 
inquiry on laughter, we have pulled deep from the west’s historical attitudes on laughter, onto 
which a scientific canon of laughter has been retrofitted— and in order to produce a pathology of 
laughter, we have reached far back into our imaginaries of the problems of taboo and morality 
with laughing.  
 As an extension of these old belief systems, the scientific discourse on laughter is more a 
biosocial process than we, or especially the scientists at the forefront of these disciplines, would 
like to admit. In this essay, I will review a history of laughter’s canon in the western world, in 
order to trace the roots of its modern incarnation, and explore how such attitudes have persisted 
and embodied themselves in the modern, empirical study of laughter. This is an effort toward a 
more holistic account of how western philosophies of laughter, or gelotologies, imagine and 
represent the reasons and purposes of laughter; and with anthropological accounts on laughing 
and humor, I will illustrate the plural ways in which it manifests in human societies. By 
participating in the discourse that these old gelotologies have produced, this paper offers a study 
of laughter that seeks to comprehensively answer these questions: what is the role, the real 
significance, and the cause of human laughter? 
 To investigate the historical influences of the modern laughter discourse, we must go 
back as far as we can in early historical examples of gelotology. It is important to note, however, 
that despite laughter’s ubiquity in our lives, only a handful of important thinkers have written at 
length about the subject. Plato himself, one of the few and first to have contributed to this 
conversation, only speaks briefly about the role of comedy and laughter. In The Republic, he 
warns that “ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter, his condition provokes a 
violent reaction” (Bloom, 66: 1968), and so the philosopher guardians of his hypothetical utopian 
state to avoid laughter in practice, as he believed that it leads away from rationality. His student, 
Aristotle, asserted by contrast that the ensoulment of an infant occurred at the time of its first 
laugh, at which point the baby may be considered fully human (Bakhtin, 1968; Sanders, 1996). 
This is one of many convictions about laughter that have persisted as long as our written 
accounts of it have existed, that such an affective display puts our rationality at risk.  
Another equally durable image of laughter paints it in a more favorable light however: in 
the Old Testament, we are told that “A joyful heart is good medicine, but a broken spirit dries up 
the bones” (Psalms, 17:22 NASB). This early connection between healthfulness and laughter is 
only the first of many throughout the next couple millennia. An old English proverb advises one 
to “laugh and grow fat,” as merriment was associated with healthful weight gain at the time. 
Simultaneously, however, the bible denigrates laughter at times, and when God himself laughs, it 
is often characterized as wrathful or scornful (Psalms 2:2-5).  
 This duality of laughter continues to be a problem for scholars who dare address the 
subject for a long time after— and the jury is still out on this case. Next I want to focus on the 
dark side of laughter for the Euro-American; as Protestant communities continue diffusing into 
the New World, we see groups like Calvinists decry laughter as a form of sin. Lines from the 
Bible, such as “and there must be no filthiness and silly talk, or coarse jesting, which are not 
fitting, but rather giving of thanks,” (Ephesians 5:4) continue to stress this.  
 Westerners’ ambivalence toward laughter continues to show in the literature of the 
Enlightenment era, as figures such as Thomas Hobbes produce a derisive characterization of 
laughter, as so-called schadenfreude that elevates the status of laughter while demoting the target 
of laughter (Sanders, 1996). From this phenomenon we have derived one of the three main 
theories of laughter, called the “superiority theory,” the notion that we laugh in part to maintain 
and improve our status at the cost of others’ own status. Further, Philip Stanhope, the 4th Earl of 
Chesterfield, warns his son in a letter that “Frequent and loud laughter is the characteristic of 
folly and ill-manners,” advising his son to maintain a sense of temperance throughout his life 
(1748).  
 It is also important to note that, first, Hobbes’s attitudes toward laughter reflect his 
philosophy of the human condition, that “human behavior is self-interested” (Telfer, 1995: 359). 
The implication here is that thinkers’ affect toward or against the so-called nature of humanity 
has a keen influence on their interpretations of laughter, among other behaviors. Additionally, it 
is notable that not everyone agreed with Hobbes on this point: Francis Hutcheson wrote his 
“Reflections Upon Laughter” in 1725 in a direct criticism toward Hobbes’s theory of “sudden 
glory” (ibid.). In it he remarks upon the absurdity that all human laughter makes a juxtaposition 
between the status of the laughter and that of his or her target of laughter (1971: 7-8). Rather, 
Hutcheson posits that “mental” laughter arises out of a “perception of the ludicrous” (Telfer, 
1995: 360). This position, while maybe as limiting as Hobbes’s own account, places laughter in 
the realm of cognition and human understanding, in terms of the origin of humor; this initial 
explanation will prove extremely useful in constructing an anthropology of laughter later on— 
but for now let us talk more about Hobbes and other “misogelasts”.  
 Such negative sentiments toward laughter and humor persist in the 19th century as 
writers with Victorian sensibilities bemoan laughter as something rash that betrays one’s 
composure (Passes and Overing, 2000; Vasey, 1875). In this respect, the pejorative meaning of 
foolishness, with its connection to the fool—that is, the court jester—and laughter, continues to 
gain symbolic significance. In his Philosophy of Laughter and Smiling, Vasey writes in the mid 
nineteenth century on the origin of laughter, claiming that children are encouraged and 
conditioned to laugh until they “very naturally begin to associate the action of laughter with 
trashy nonsense and foolish talk” (88: 1875). He takes this further by comparing it to coughing 
as a physiological response, claiming that both are caused by “influence… of a painful and 
injurious character” (ibid.: 1875).  
 So far, the recurring themes in western evaluations of laughter have consisted of morality 
and health: in order to determine whether or not laughter is good for someone, these thinkers 
have mused upon whether or not laughter has positive health effects, as well as whether laughter 
is a good or bad thing to do, that is, in a moral sense. Enlightenment and Victorian era sentiments 
of laughter echo convictions of thinkers who range as far back as Plato; the question this raises is 
how these old ideologies have influenced modern contemplations of the same subject. 
Rationality is situated in this discourse as the capacity of human understanding to understand and 
interpret the world, imagined on the opposite side of a spectrum of the human condition as 
emotion. In this imagining, logos and pathos are constructed as opposing forces in western 
paradigms of humanity, with the former valorized as the pinnacle of humanity because of its role 
in reasoning. Emotion is juxtaposed within this dichotomy as opposing reason, and so is regarded 
inversely as irrational. If laughter is then understood as an emotional, affective display, it 
becomes dangerous, as overriding or destroying the capacity of human understanding.  
 
Biosocial Models of Laughter 
Following the Enlightenment and beyond the mid-19th century, there is a distinct change 
in who talks critically about laughter, which leads into the empirical research of laughter as 
behavior, response, and more. Here I will argue— by looking at the literature of contemporary 
bioscientists and psychologists— that while the methods and paradigms used to evaluate laughter 
change drastically in this time period, the results of such research are clear reprises long-standing 
Euro-American social attitudes. This shift is attributable to the various subscribers of the modern 
canon of bioscience, but the two figures that have arguably been the most influential in changing 
the way we talk about laughter today are Sigmund Freud and Charles Darwin.  
Freud brought his psychoanalytical theories into the forefront of how we talk about 
laughter and its relationship with the mind: he believed that laughter and its source, humor, are 
all embedded within the mind. In his Jokes and Their Relation to the Human Psyche, Freud 
explores how laughter serves to release energy and tension from the psyche, setting a precedent 
for future gelotologies by anchoring laughter, in this paradigm, as residing in the individual’s 
psychological attachments to emotion and society (1905).  
 Darwin reinforces these associations, but in a different respect, with his research and 
writings on evolution and adaptation. With regards to animal emotion and expression, Darwin 
believed that such responses as laughter had their beginnings in our evolutionary history as basic 
social responses: for other mammals, laughter would have had its uses namely for in-group 
socialization and play (1875). This interpretation establishes laughter in phylogenetic terms: that 
is, it suggests that laughter is a bodily function the purpose and source of which resonates from 
our mammalian ancestors. And so this implication further establishes a canon of how laughter 
can be understood and imagined via western biosocial frameworks.  
 These two figures make the transition from the old science of laughter into its 
contemporary discourse very distinct: rather than discussing laughter in terms of its effects on 
rationality, or its relation to morality, Freud and Darwin hone in on dilemmas such as the causes 
of human laughter, as well as explanations of why humans laugh. These distinctions, primarily 
Darwin’s, hold great importance as a biological account of laughter holds a huge, if not 
hegemonic, amount of symbolic power. With this in mind, the next step these disciplines— 
evolutionary biology, psychology, and more— chose to take becomes more surprising. 
 That is, despite this sudden paradigm shift within the discussion of laughter, the 
contemporary, so-called science of laughter, to a large degree, still focuses on these historical 
questions Euro-American societies always had about laughter: is laughter good for you? Is 
laughter dangerous? And when should I or shouldn’t I laugh? In the next section of this essay I 
will look at various studies and research projects that the new gelotologists have undergone to 
answer these questions, to further illustrate the tenacity of biosocial thinkers to fit laughter within 
these frameworks.  
 In order to answer this first question in modernity— “is laughter good for you?”—  
scientists have had to integrate existing models of laughter into the newly fledged discourse of 
biomedicine. This process involves a sort of conversion of old maxims into new science: that is, 
for laughter to be healthy in this modern medical paradigm, such a claim must be made 
empirically valid. In this conversion, old beliefs are both retrofitted into and reinforced by this 
new, hegemonic system— by asserting, for example, that laughter resides within primeval 
evolutionary mechanisms, we maintain the moral economy that historically mediated the use of 
laughter, by framing it within a new, biosocial regime of truth, a la Foucault (1975).  
 Throughout the process of this conversion, scientists have gone great lengths to reify 
these old beliefs: for instance, one study shows that subjects who laugh for extended periods of 
one hour or so have distinctly higher white blood cell counts than the control group who hasn’t 
(Lee et al., 2001). Additionally, laughter has, according to research, the benefit of being aerobic 
exercise (Wilkins, 2009). This has led to a following of people using laughter for exercise, such 
as Dr. Madan Kataria, known as the Laughter Guru, who uses it in Yoga classes called “laughter 
yoga” (Kataria, 2015). Such exercises are performed in groups led typically by trained 
instructors, and sessions can span 35-40 minutes in length; however there are instructions 
available on how to perform laughter yoga by one’s self as well (ibid.).  
 Despite all of this, scientific investigation of laughter has not unanimously concluded that 
laughter is “good for us”— in fact, there is a significant conversation happening in tandem with 
these others on the adverse effects of laughter, depending on which form it takes. For example, 
in the realm of psychotherapy, laughter— particularly directed laughter, or “laughing at 
someone”— is regarded as dangerous to the mental health of patients (Kubie, 1971). The danger 
of being laughed at, Kubie argues, makes laughter a risky bet for therapeutic use. Further, cases 
of mass hysteria diagnosed as a mass psychogenic illness exist, such as the Tanganyikan 
Laughter Epidemic of 1962, where villagers in colonial Tanzania were found to be laughing and 
crying uncontrollably for so long that boarding schools where the laughter began were closed for 
weeks at a time (Provine, 2000). In this case, laughter is regarded as a symptom of psychological 
distress, and is pathologized when in a form of excess.  
 At first glance, these different accounts add up to a contradictory and confused narrative 
of the effects of laughter; how can laughter improve one’s immune system and also be a 
symptom of hysteria, how can it be dangerous and nurturing? In an even more confounding 
example, research shows that while laughter may help improve the emotional health of chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD), sufferers, the physical act of laughter can further 
damage weak lungs (Emery et al. 2011). In this particular instance, laughter, in a single context, 
heals and harms simultaneously. While each of these examples are derived from various 
disciplines, of course, they all are participating in the same practice of empirical science for the 
purpose of better understanding phenomena of the world. In this case, laughter proves to be 
difficult to categorize biomedically as either productive or deleterious to one’s health, leading to 
the conflict in truths. However, this does not prove that the science is unfounded: it only 
illustrates that Euro-American perceptions of humor within our social history of laughter have 
made the empirical process behind modern biosocial gelotology all the more more difficult.  
 Beyond the health effects of laughter, scientists have strived to produce a more coherent 
etiology of laughter— and in order to understand why we laugh, we must understand first what 
good it does to laugh in the first place. The purpose of laughter in this discourse will have its 
origins in the social behavior of humans, as it follows from their evolutionary past. This train of 
thought in particular is influenced by Darwin’s work, as it reaffirms the phylogeny of laughter, 
the continued role of laughing as an adaptive behavior of animals.  
 First, evolutionary biologists have observed and claimed that most mammals exhibit 
some form of laughter, typically associated with play (Scott, 2015). The most analogous 
evolutionary comparison we have to human laughter is that of chimps, primates whose likeness 
to humans in behavior and physiology allow them to be seen as a consistent reference to our 
genetic pasts. While they do not laugh in the same manner as us, they inhale in a familiar, 
rhythmic “ah-ah-ah!” pattern that is often exhibited during social play (Provine, 2000). This 
behavior of expressive, patterned breathing, Provine suggests, is the precursor to human laughter. 
The implication of this is that if in fact the laughter of chimps is the behavioral origin of our own 
sort of laughter, we can investigate the purpose of the chimps’ behavior in order to understand 
the reasons for our own.  
 The etiology of chimp laughter then becomes a part of our own— what theories suggest 
is that chimps emit this laugh-like noise when interacting with other chimps in non-violent 
situations, as if to communicate that “I’m just playing” (ibid.). The significance of this is that 
laughter becomes codified as a mechanism of sociality and in-group communication and 
reinforcement. While human laughter has wildly different causes, biosocial scientists have 
determined from this research that the roots of its purpose as a social, communicative behavior.  
 This investigation has not been limited to primates, either. In a study of lab rats, scientists 
noticed that lab rats emit an excited chatter during play— researchers realized that they could 
induce the same chatter by “tickling” the rats, which means that these low-frequency noises 
researchers recorded could be a sort of rat laughter (Panksepp and Burgdoff, 2003). What  
Burgdoff and Panksepp’s research here suggests is that the same mechanisms of in-group 
sociality and play that dictate the adaptive function of human laughter are present as far back our 
evolutionary history as rats.  
 Jaak Panksepp goes further to posit that this rat laughter helps illuminate the purpose of 
laughter with regards to developmental psychology— the origin of humor, he claims, can be 
pinpointed to the laughter of play, incited by simple social and physical interactions like tickling, 
which over time become more complex, first as games like Peek-a-Boo, and eventually as jokes 
encoded in language. Moreover, if “it is a reasonable but not a scientifically established view that 
the human taste for humor is based, in some fundamental way, on the existence of infantile and 
childhood joy and laughter,” (ibid. 542) as Panksepp and Burgdoff notes then laughter is in more 
than one way a far cry to humanity’s evolutionary infancy. 
 That humor is a learned construction we develop out of early forms of play also echoes 
Vasey’s claims over a century before that the source of the less-than-savory human laughter is 
the conditioning of young children who ordinarily would not laugh at all. However, this notion 
conflicts with others who suggest that laughter comes naturally to infants at roughly the third or 
fourth month of age (Addyman & Addyman, 2013) and is not always a result of play. For 
example, infantile laughter is often caused by the sight of the child’s mother or father, as well as 
other simple social stimuli. The significance of this is that laughter, even in its earliest forms, can 
signify one of many things, ranging from play to joy to excitement.  
 But laughter in contemporary social and scientific research extends beyond the crib as 
well. In a social study of the daily usage of laughter in American society, Provine shows us a 
plethora of striking results. Two that I consider interesting are that, first, laughter between 
acquaintances is uncommonly the result of what is perceived as humor, and second, that women 
laugh much more frequently than men (2000). This first piece of information reinforces this 
notion that laughter and humor do not always go hand in hand, and that laughter and sociality are 
more connected than first thought— overall, humor is the cause of laughter per roughly one in 
five instances of laughter in Provine’s study.  
 These results speak to how important laughter has persisted as a form of communication 
throughout our evolutionary history, Provine suggests; that we are still laughing with people over 
non-humorous matters leads scientists to believe that the same function of in-group 
communication that motivates chimps and even rats to laugh also persists in human phylogeny. 
That second result of Provine’s study, that women laugh more frequently than men, illustrates 
how in different ways humans can communicate with laughter. This is a part of what the author 
refers to as the phenomenon called “downward laughter,” the notion that people of lower social 
stature laugh more frequently than their perceived higher-ups. This is also true within 
workplaces, regardless of gender: during meetings, bosses tell jokes at a much higher rate than 
their underlings, who by association laugh more at said jokes.  
In this context of gender, downward laughter can be read as a signal of meekness and 
submission as well. Women in Provine’s studies laughed a distinct amount more than their male 
counterparts, in a trend comparable to supervisors or managers and their subordinates. In this 
case, laughter continues to be a mode of unconscious communication, allowing groups to 
unconsciously assert dominion or inferiority. This language of laughter, while removed from its 
old evolutionary context, still works to communicate tacit ideas of status, showing what Provine, 
Panksepp and Burgdoff, and more would argue to be more of the new adaptive purposes of 
laughter for humankind.  
With regards to laughter and gender difference, this particular example offers a glimpse 
into the incompleteness of this narrative: the difference here is that women laugh a great deal 
more regardless of whether they are laughing at men or other women; what this alone signifies is 
that discrepancies in laughter between genders are more complex. Despite this, women’s more 
frequent laughter compared to men becomes analogous to underlings’ laughter at bosses because 
of the implicit subjugation in action here. What these researchers have established in their work 
is a bio-historical canon of laughter that accounts for the meanings and uses of laughter that 
perhaps had not been previously considered in its Euro-American history— whereas morality 
and health were key focuses of historical etiologies of laughter, this new discourse illustrates the 
way this behavior functions in a modern context: born from phylogenetic necessity for our 
biological ancestors to communicate something to one another, long before we adapted the 
capacity for language. Laughter is then, within this framing, a primeval language that elevates 
and complicates humankind’s evolutionary status.  
But what then is the implication of laughter being for the monkeys? With this train of 
thought, we have discussed laughter mainly in terms of being a social mechanism and an 
adaptive function of relationality— a conversation that appears to set itself apart from older ones 
about this subject. However, even though Provine et al. seem to be exploring new frontiers in 
their bioevolutionary research and inquiry, their work continues to speak to these problems of 
morality and emotion that occupy the dilemma of laughter. That is, by constructing a model for 
the phylogeny of laughter, from rats to apes to humans, these authors have reified the argument 
that laughing is a base, emotional response. 
In these studies, in slight or serious ways, researchers of all sorts have taken branches of 
bioscience to not only call back to our enduring beliefs about the etiology of laughter, but they 
also strengthen their validity with the hegemonic institution of bioscientific discourse. Through 
medicine, we confirm that laughter can be of great health benefit: it not only improves immunity 
to disease, but it also improves mental health and can even burn calories! These descriptions 
make laughing sound in content like a super drug, and appropriately its side effects make users 
reassess its usefulness: it can be injurious to the human psyche, and even the body if your lungs 
are already damaged; further, in excess laughter can signify mental distress or disorientation, like 
in cases of hysteria.  
In producing a bioscience of laughter, researchers have taken the old gelotology governed 
by morality and health and, in its way, has made a great effort to answer the question, “why do 
we laugh?” But the canon is incomplete— laughter harms as much as it heals, it is both sinful 
and divine, malicious and encouraging, as well as submissive and dominating. Despite the great 
lengths these scientists have gone, the contradictions that had occupied the old Euro-American 
beliefs on laughing continue in their own science of the subject. This persistence is because the 
same logic that served to explain the role and place of laughter before is, as these studies 
indicate, still present today. 
 That is, the models we have in place to explain laughter’s purpose as well as its effects 
fall short— and will continue to— because of its lack of plasticity. This model takes for granted 
that there is one word to express what is, at its essence, a repeated, sometimes loud and rapid 
exhaling to produce sounds that resemble “haha”s, “heehee”s, et cetera; the word is then 
expressed as a construction like “behavior” or “bodily function” and becomes steadily less 
helpful in understanding the real purpose of these actions. The science of laughter strives to 
reduce this “thing that we do” so that not only further inquiry into the subject may be easier but 
so we can better understand it, broadly speaking.  
 And so the failure of this new gelotology, as well as the old ones, is due to the fact that 
despite this attempt at reduction, laughter has refused to be fully explainable— a product of both 
the models through which we have tried to understand it as well as the complexity of the thing in 
the first place. Rather than being a good or bad thing, laughter, in this model, has shown to be 
both; it occupies a liminal space that offers a plurality of meanings and purposes. When we 
situate laughter biomedically as something existing somewhere on an axis between healthful and 
harmful, in a similar manner that Euro-American gelotologies have juxtaposed it within a 
spectrum between logos and pathos. Such a model integrates both of these spectra onto a graph 
of morality between the healthfulness and rationality—or lack thereof—of laughter. However, 
laughter, when singularly represented on this model, appears in a range of disparate coordinates, 
in different instances as well as at the same time.  
This suggests a flaw in either the models by which we have attempted to evaluate the role 
and place laughter in and of itself, or a misunderstanding of what we mean by laugher in the first 
place. That is, can laughter be more than one thing? In the next section of this essay, I will look 
at other anthropological writings on the social meaning, performance, and purpose of laughter as 
accounted by other societies across the world. In looking at these different logics and 
perspectives on this subject, we can further understand what gaps persist within our own 
frameworks on humor and laughter, as well as what alternative models of laughter and humor we 
can use to further advance this discourse. 
As this model of the axes of healthfulness and rationality serve to illustrate modern, 
biosocial gelotology, it demonstrates that this first dichotomy between rationality and emotion 
remains a crux of the subject, as it did in historical models of the “goodness” of laughter. Euro-
American discourses on laughing and humor will inevitably interact with this matrix at some 
point, and so the same is true for anthropology: as this discipline itself has grown out of these 
older social studies, its evaluation of laughter will also encompass some of the older theories that 
have been produced by it. In order to understand the current anthropological analysis of laughter, 
as well as its relation to and disconnection from the self-titled “science of laughter,” it is 
important to understand the philosophy that serves as foundation for each.  
While there are a plethora of different theories regarding laughter, the three that have the 
strongest influence on these other theories are the theories of relief, incongruity, and superiority. 
Each of these draws from the thinkers previously discussed, in different ways, and notably are 
often referred to as theories of humor as well, suggesting that these are archetypes of humor also 
bears the notion that these three criteria account for what I will refer to as the aesthetics of 
laughter. For example. the theory of superiority explains that laughter is used to explain the trope 
of the fool: we laugh at those who are lower than us because they are foolish, they experience 
misfortune and we recognize their plight as well as our dissociation from their position.  
This model speaks to Hobbes’s idea of “sudden glory,” as well as the concept of 
“schadenfreude,” and is foundational in the moral politics of laughter. Such an association also 
supports the premise that laughter goes hand in hand with emotions of aggression— and again, 
this theory is a reflection of Hobbes’s own ideas concerning the human condition. The belief that 
derisive laughter creates not only an imbalance of power but also the psyche has been a source of 
ambivalence in this field for centuries. A second front runner of these models is that of relief 
theory, which suggests that the reason we laugh is to cope and deal with emotional imbalances— 
nervous laughter, or the sort of laughter one emits while in pain, or under emotional duress, to 
sublimate different sorts of social miscues and other kinds of suffering. Freud speaks the most 
explicitly to this theory in his own address of the psyche (1905).  
Finally, the incongruity theory of laughter, which is inspired by Francis Hutcheson’s own 
theories here, offers a more complex approach to the purposes of humorous laughter, in that it 
assesses the actual mechanics or aesthetics of humor: it posits that laughter is born out of jokes 
or situations that create what is essentially a dissonance of meaning. That is, when asked, “why 
the chicken crossed the road?” we are given a premise. The answer, “to get to the other side” 
creates a mental puzzle for the receiver of the joke. In this timeless example, the solution of the 
problem is something so simple provokes a sense of confusion, an incongruity between the 
components of the situation that the listener must resolve. If the recipient of the joke fails to do 
this, then they “do not get it,” and the joke falls flat.  
Humor, in this case, deals with the absurd, the grotesque, and even the sublime— its use 
is to investigate and reassess the meanings of conventional things that, when rearranged or 
subverted, stop making sense; they lose meaning, or the meaning changes, within these 
incongruities. This power of humor, the aesthetic of jokes, which when properly enacted evokes 
laughter, is the bedrock of the issues that all of these discourses have tried to assess: it makes 
laughter exciting, provocative, and in many cases, dangerous. Yet this is all contingent with the 
premise of the incongruity theory, that humor, the production of something funny, is the 
necessary antecedent of laughter in this case; but more importantly, the processual enactment of 
humor is embedded in exchanges and subversions of symbolic meaning, in the form of joke-
telling.  
Again, these are the three most influential theories regarding laughter, listed with a brief 
social history of their influence on various gelotologies. The extent of their reach in this 
discourse is apparent in the way they are still applied, both implicitly and explicitly, in 
contemporary academic research; in some cases, they are even evaluated in plain terms with their 
relation to physiological well-being (Wilkins & Eisenbraun, 2009). It is important to note that 
this list is far from exhaustive, and more theories of laughter have come to be in recent years 
(Smuts, 2016), but their influence on the discourses of both bioscience and anthropology are 
much more limited.  
Moreover, these theories are not mutually exclusive: they all have their place in 
explaining the multiple causes and purposes of human laughter. However the incongruity theory 
proves the most useful with regards to discussing the anthropology of the aesthetics of humor; 
this is in part due to the plasticity of the theory in how it accounts for the various kinds of 
laughter this paper assesses, but also to the fact that it lends itself most closely to anthropological 
models of human cognition and understanding.  
 This is because the incongruity theory assesses laughter in terms of meaning that is 
socially delegated between the two parties of the joke teller and her audience. Humor is produced 
in the subversion of symbols, and so laughter is the acknowledgement of the success of this 
subversion. This means that through the process of joke-telling, humans are constantly trying to 
heighten the meaning of certain things— ideals, beliefs, institutions— while devaluing others, or 
changing them in radically different ways. The process of joke-telling follows a format 
analogous to Marx’s dialectical materialism, by which he discusses societal change through 
political paradigm shifts. Here, with the thesis of jokes being the premise, and their punchline 
being the antithesis, the attainment of new meaning through the resolution of Hutcheson’s 
“incongruity” is the synthesis of new symbolic imaginings of the things mediated between the 
joke teller, his audience and the joke’s subject matter.  
 This process is essentially a humor dialectic by which new meaning is produced in the 
laughter-making process. To understand better the role and place of laughter, particularly 
humorous laughter as Hutcheson’s theory frames it, it is helpful to take a look at how 
anthropology has framed the ways in which humor is implemented, performed, and mediated in 
different societies to illustrate the extent to which humor can be powerful. By investigating the 
many ways societies use humor in social praxis, we learn more about role of humor for natives of 
an ethnography as well as its role for ourselves. How often do they laugh?; when do they laugh?; 
and what constitutes humor? We can and have asked these questions, and in doing so have 
catalogued the local gelotologies of dozens of societies.  
 But before that— at the beginning of this essay, I asked you to imagine a time where you 
could not stop laughing, followed by a time where you were forced to stop laughing. I want to 
reflect further on this latter idea some more, that laughter can be taken from us, and what 
happens when this occurs. If you cannot recall a time where you have been chastised for 
laughing, think instead of a time where someone mocked you for your laugh— this scenario 
resonates with me because despite being a tall, young man with a deep voice, I have a shrill, 
high-pitched laugh that becomes especially shrill when I think something is really funny. It is 
obnoxious. But I don’t think about it unless someone makes fun of me for it, either with a strange 
look or by mimicking me with a scathing cackle of their own.  
 The reason I bring this up is because if you can relate to this experience, even despite not 
having as strange a laugh as me, you can probably recall the deep feeling of disempowerment 
that came with someone making fun of your own laugh. When faced with this, you may feel a 
sense of embarrassment pour over you (I know I do). Not only do you become the target of 
derisive laughter in this case, but also you are left without the choice to laugh anymore— lest 
you face further teasing. In a way this feels disempowering, because you have been discouraged 
from laughing any more. What can you do instead, at this point?  
 This is not a trivial predicament to think about when reflecting upon the value of humor 
and laughing within Euro-American societies, as well as in interpreting the role and place these 
things occupy within other human societies. Keep these anecdotes in mind as I review the 
existing anthropological literature that delves, no matter how briefly, into this subject of laughter 
among indigenous societies of, namely, Melanesian and Amazonian societies. Note how these 
pluralist philosophies of laughter, as well as the disciplinary frameworks through which we 
interpret them, differ from the biosocial gelotology that I reviewed in the first part of this essay.  
 What this ethnographic data— a review of biosocial studies of laughter, in a sort of 
“anthropology of professionals”—  has shown us, is that by and large laughter must be 
understood in terms of physiology and phylogeny, of bodies and behaviors. Meanwhile, 
anthropological literature on the same subject posits that, per ethnographic data, most every 
human society or collective enacts laughter through complex humor dialectics, in diverse and 
equally ritual or novel social practices. Laughter, anthropology has argued, is an important 
emotional or affective display that allows humans among a singular or plural people to better 
integrate with one another socially, improving a sense of solidarity or connectivity among 
them— this is a part of a set of social processes that anthropologists of emotion have focused on 
as a component of the production of conviviality.  
As well as this, laughter among a wide range of human societies has served a clear and 
precise political goal: that is, funny laughter, when enacted by a dialectic of humor, allows 
marginalized groups in these societies to reevaluate the paradigms through which power 
structures are maintained. Further, the control of laughter within a society or collective tends to 
reside among those who possess control over other assets of our social lives; the tighter this grip 
on the production and experience of humor, the more hegemonic the symbolic institutions that 
mediate it are in the first place. To illustrate this point, Bakhtin observes that in Renaissance era 
Europe, gratuitous laughter was reserved for strictly ritualistic spaces like the carnival; in 
limiting the physical and imagined social spaces where laughter can exist, there is a clear relation 
between who controls the designation of these spaces and the inferred symbolic power of 
laughter (1965:271).  
 So in anthropology, laughter occupies a specific role and place in humanity’s social 
universe: humorous laughter, or laughter produced by something funny,  results in a synthesis of 
new meaning, and so produces new relations between the self and the other, or between the self 
and the imagining of another idea, person, or concept. This is the power of the symbolic 
subversion of ideas and social relations that occurs within a humor dialectic. Among these 
different outcomes, there are various ethnographies that demonstrate the empowering energy 
apparent within these aesthetics of humor; that is, humor in specific contexts provides an 
opportunity to reconstruct one’s own milieu, as meaning changes hands in the subversive 
practice of humor; the result is a change, of variable significance, in the power dynamics 
between producers and targets of laughter. Anke Reichenbach and Fatema Hashem illustrate this 
process in their ethnography of Bahraini women who use mimesis and crude humor toward their 
husbands in order to improve both their affective and political standing within their gendered 
status (2005).  
 Laughter empowers a collective in manners beyond just this simpler shift in social 
standing; in other examples, laughter is a device that weakens the hold powerful beings have 
within structures that range from the political to the cosmological. The former of these two is 
illustrated in Klumbyté’s ethnography of the 2008 Lithuanian political campaign: in this 
campaign, political groups produced a plethora of humorous advertisements that make jokes 
about the political process, often at the expense of other candidates (2014). And in a classic 
example from indigenous Amazonian peoples,  the mythic stories of the Chulupi people found in 
Paraguay are often humorous and risque accounts of revered beings within their cosmology —
such as the shaman and the jaguar—that are often portrayed as foolish and perverse (Clastres, 
2000).  
 Such stories of flawed deities and magical beings harken back to canons such as ancient 
Greek mythology, but are still common today among Amazonian peoples: in Piaroa stories of 
their creator gods, a brother and a sister, the errant actions of the siblings lead to strife for 
themselves as well as the production of a dangerous laughing condition called k’ireau, or 
monkey urine madness (Overing, 2000). These stories are integral to understanding the 
relationship between these given peoples and their myth systems and social structures, and so the 
aesthetic of humor behind these stories demands close scrutiny in order to make this interpretive 
process possible.  
 However, each of these examples yields a different group with a different sociality and 
approach to humor, as well as a different interpretation from the ethnographers themselves. For 
Clastres, the humor of the perverted shaman serves to make distinct the role of real shamans, as 
well as the place of jaguars in Chulupi cosmology. The bawdy stories use Bakhtin’s idea of the 
grotesque to reinforce their social logic by enacting contrasting and subversive symbols, while 
also providing relief to the storyteller and audience, ordinarily beside themselves with fear of 
these mythic figures. Overing, by contrast, focuses upon the act of storytelling itself, and how 
laughter and other affective displays contribute to the conviviality of the Piaroa. In this 
interpretation, laughter’s role is to reinforce emotional bonds among kin and affines.  
 However not all laughter is acceptable among the Piaroa— directed laughter between 
genders, such as if a group of men laugh at a woman, or vice versa, is considered socially 
harmful and counterproductive (ibid.). Further, among other Amerindians such as the Guayaki, 
laughter is a scornful and often very dangerous behavior: like with birth, for instance, 
participants, including the mother, must remain silent for the duration of the ritual. No sound, 
and especially no laughter, Clastres stresses, is allowed to be heard the entire time (1998). 
According to Clastres, the Guayaki are a very quiet people, which is a lifestyle that is informed 
by their mythos as well as their sense of sociality. However, this does not mean the serious 
Guayaki forsake the activity of laughter entirely;  in fact in one ceremony, the group engages in a 
ritual tickling where they play and excite each other to uncontrollable laughter (ibid.).  
 Moreover, this dichotomy of good and bad laughter is further embodied in Makushi 
conceptions of laughter: for this Amazonian group, laughter can either be positive and healing, 
which is described as “laughter with others” (Scherberger, 2005). This form of laughter is similar 
to how Overing describes convivial laughter of the Piaroa, but occupies a space more liminal and 
revered as it is used in Makushi healing and shamanic rituals. Negative laughter, which consists 
of directed and derisive laughter, is also more significant for the Makushi as it is associated with 
the dangerous laughter of the howler monkey, and so with sorcery and malintent as well.  
 Beyond ethnographies of Amerindians, anthropologists have found that laughter also 
maintains an invaluable role to the ritual practices of other societies, such as those of the South 
Pacific. The Makeo people of Papua New Guinea, for example, humor is an important 
mechanism in funerary practices: in these rituals, the Makeo feed and engorge one another’s kin 
in a manner they find absolutely hilarious (Mitchell, 1992). In this case, laughter seeks to 
sublimate the feelings of grief while instilling a sense of support among affinal kin. In an 
example that resembles Klumbyté’s ethnography of Bahraini women, the Lusi-Kaliai use 
mimesis in rituals to mimic and taunt opposite gender roles (ibid.).  
 With regards to each of these examples, laughter persists thematically as a component of 
ritual processes; these are essential to what are considered to be liminal events— the purpose of 
these in-between moments in the cultural praxis of these peoples is to reinforce the social and 
symbolic bonds among the groups that already occupy this space in the first place (Turner, 
1966). That humor and laughter occur in these processes so frequently, I argue, is because 
laughter is itself a liminal process as what it causes participants in examples of “ritual play” to do 
is reflect upon a dissonant chord in one’s social logic, which is embedded with cultural symbols. 
 The incongruity of the joke brings the meanings of, for example, gender roles, kinship 
ties or cosmologies, into question: in evaluating these symbols and institutions within the context 
of the joke, they are brought into a liminal area, cognitively and experientially; after resolving 
the symbolic problem of the joke, the audience’s laughter is not only a queue that the joke’s 
purpose has been fulfilled, but it is also a distinct affective display that further reifies the reality 
of a group’s social bonds. The synthesis, in regard to a humor dialectic, is a social bond that 
reifies the place of— in the context of Turner— structural and anti-structural symbols.  
 What these ethnographies also indicate is that laughter’s role in a society or other form of 
collective is highly variable; for the Guayaki, who revere silence in both ritual and everyday 
praxis, laughter is often dangerous. For the Makushi and the Chulupi, directed laughter is 
problematic as it is associated with malevolence and sorcery, while also being regarded as 
socially destructive. In the majority of these ethnographic accounts of the nature of laughter, 
among other indigenous groups, laughter is enacted in a way where good and bad laughter are 
made distinct from one another, in discourse and to a lesser extent in social practice. That is, 
while social frameworks allow differential forms of laughter (nervous, joyful, and humorous) to 
be understood and discussed distinctly, they are not always easily distinguishable in everyday 
social activity (Scherberger, 2005).  
On the Politics of Humor 
 This scrutiny of the role and place of laughter, in discourse and social practice, is 
consistent among each of these groups, and in a way both distinct and parallel to the modern 
biosocial gelotology of non-western society; laughter remains a liminal affective display that is 
under the constant symbolic negotiation and evaluation of joke tellers and recipients. What I 
argue, however, is that the conditions of political and symbolic structures apparent in so-called 
eurocentric societies makes the liminal process of laughter exceedingly more complicated, and 
so these acts become more questionable in the interpretive process intrinsic to the incongruity 
theory of laughter.  
 Euro-American societies do have the language to describe the vast spectrum of meanings 
behind laughter; humor can be in bad taste, mean-spirited, or derisive. Good humor is exactly 
that— uplifting and cheerful. However the difference here is that with peoples like the Makushi 
where this spectrum of meaning is accounted for within social praxis, making these distinctions 
consistently feasible within their own social logic; meanwhile the structures discussed in the first 
half of this essay— political and social institutions, such as Christian theology and monarchic 
and democratic government— contribute to a different symbolic understanding of what laughter 
means and does in these societies. 
 With these institutions there are clear impacts that people within them have on the 
relations of power in Euro-American societies: theology and biology bear a hegemonic authority 
over models of thought and the epistemologies of the body and mind. With the strength of these 
paradigms as sources of knowledge claims, they possess a great deal of rapport among our 
imaginary of the etiologies of laughter; in this process, laughter is discursively remodeled from 
an enactment of power and sociability into a bodily function, a base natural response.  
 However despite these distinctions we make in the discourse of humor and the meaning 
of laughter do not exclude it from the inevitable redistribution of meaning and power that are 
implicit in humor— they only make this process more problematic. Indeed humorists and 
satirists still provoke and taunt powerful, dangerous forces of the western world: historically 
western society had Jonathan Swift and Voltaire, and in the modern day, cartoonists make 
iconoclastic images of the prophet Mohammed and comedians taunt politicians. In the case of 
the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, we have seen that such provocation can incite real symbolic 
and political violence and consequences. 
 This is why the device of political humor becomes a powerful and potentially dangerous 
agent in the strata of power in our society, because the synthesis of a humor dialectic like this is 
produced by the joke recipient, and the results can prove deadly when people don’t think it’s 
funny. Also by political humor, I do not refer to jokes that are simply of a political context (e.g. 
editorial cartoons), but rather humor that is designed intentionally to take advantage of the 
production of incongruent representations and imaginings of symbols; that is, a form of laughter 
that delineates the imagining of a political figure, belief or structure from its real position of 
power. Humor becomes political in this sense when its producer seeks to gain or detract power 
from the target of this humor. Insofar as this process is conducive to directed laughter, it 
necessarily draws skepticism from societies where such laughter is pejorative. 
 However at first glance it will appear that from every paradigm and philosophy of 
laughter that I have reviewed in this essay demonize such directed laughter, schadenfreude or 
“sudden glory”; because of this, the next question I wish to raise is this: what connections can we 
draw between, for example, the practice of bawdy, mythic storytelling in the Chulupi and the 
Piaroa and the parodic practice of political humor in western societies? In essence, each of these 
enacts such dangerous laughter for a seemingly “political” end. Those Amazonian peoples 
engage with the bawdy myth in—what Clastres lays out as, and I would argue to be— an effort 
to exercise agency over seemingly unstoppable and dangerous cosmological forces. 
Where all of these ideas come together, in regard to the politics of humor, is that with 
Bakhtin’s construction of the carnival and grotesque, in tandem with the concept of Turnerian 
liminality, we can critique the production and enactment of political humor in Euro-American 
societies. This is possible because, if laughter’s place is mediated and confined to convivial and 
liminal ritual spaces— such as Bakhtin’s conception of the Renaissance carnival space where 
laughter is allowed— then carnivalesque humor discourses where culturally dominant ideas are 
contested are limited to these spaces as well. In a Foucauldian sense, then, when a biosocial 
canon of laughter relegates these social acts to the categories of behavior and bodily function, the 
capacity for humorists to enact the carnivalesque to combat the regimes of truth wherein these 
symbols become contested in the first place. As neuroscientist Sophie Scott glibly puts it, in 
regard to human laughter in this biosocial paradigm, “you and me baby ain’t nothin’ but 
mammals” (2015).  
Conclusion 
 In this thesis I have offered an introspective look into the social imaginings of laughter, 
both old and new, in Euro-American societies. This has consisted of the historical philosophies, 
cosmologies and aesthetics of humor that have shaped the way westerners have looked at 
laughter across time. Aristotle believed an infant’s first laugh coincides with its ensoulment; 
Pliny said that “only one man, Zoroaster, began to laugh at the time of his birth; this was 
interpreted as an omen of his divine wisdom” (Bakhtin, 69: 1968). This part of the paper 
illustrated that laughter has not only been a discursive focus of thinkers, humorists, etc but also 
an area of contention for these figures.  
The reason for this contention is twofold: first, there is the moral dilemma that laughter 
brings to those who produce and enact it that has left westerners unsure of its role and place as 
social and affective display. Additionally, laughter as an emotional performance, in and of itself, 
becomes a part of a dichotomy with rationality, where an excess of laughter— a quantity 
conservatively defined by the likes of Plato or the 4th Earl of Chesterfield— overrides and 
opposes human rationality. Each of these perspectives on laughter echoes their respective 
proponents’ attitudes toward humanity: Hobbes, who believed human behavior is governed by 
the preservation and interest of the self, extends similar sentiments toward laughter. Moreover, 
philosophers and temperate (but haughty) socialites demonize laughter for its connection to the 
emotional, lesser side of the human condition. Philosophers like Kant and Hutcheson, whose 
focuses on aesthetics and human understanding led them toward divergent and more indulgent 
opinions on laughter.  
 These two conflicts in discourse, of morality and the conditionality of humanity, have led 
to a millennia long conversation about the role and place of laughter in western societies. 
Following the path of these philosophies of laughter, or gelotologies, I produced a sort of 
ethnography of the bioscientific paradigm and its evaluation of laughter in the past century; this 
section illustrated that many of the same convictions that western thinkers established long ago 
have been reinforced by the research produced by academics of evolutionary biology and 
psychology. The position that laughter is “good” for you has been reinforced equally versus the 
notion that it is deleterious to your health: laughter has been shown to improve one’s immune 
system and overall physical health— at the same time, we see that it is dangerous to one’s 
psychological condition, and in excess is pathologized as a psychogenic illness. And so on the 
imagined analytical axes of laughter’s place, in relation to health and illness, and to emotion and 
rationality, modern science has found humor and laughing to exist on various coordinates within 
this model.  
By looking into these biosocial studies, in an “anthropology of experts,” we have learned 
that scientific research has gained a lot of traction in understanding laughter’s evolutionary 
origins: from chimps to rats, evolutionary psychologists have found that other mammals from 
humankind’s evolutionary track exhibit a sort of laughter response that is associated with play 
and sociability. These sorts of conclusions reflect the new biosocial paradigm regarding the 
human condition: when humanity is predicated by genetic and physiological conditions, we 
imagine laughter framed in a similar way: in this model, the human laugh exists as a pre-verbal 
form of communication, meaning that there is a clear evolutionary purpose not only to laughter 
but sociality in general. Moreover, scientists confine laughter’s place as a bodily function— and 
like other functions of the body, laughter is deemed “natural” and serves many biological and 
social purposes, but is embedded in a primeval set of behaviors that precede human rationality, 
and so we must mediate the enactment of laughter from ourselves and others.  
Such notions are the inevitable conclusions of this bioscientific gelotology. They resonate 
with the paradigm of older sciences and discussions of laughter as well; the moral dimensions of 
human laughter that dictated these old gelotologies are reinforced by and conflated with the 
biological conditions of laughter in this new science. What were originally mere beliefs— that 
laughter often is dangerous, scornful and unruly—  are now canonized as knowledge claims by 
the empirical lens of the biosciences. Laughter is no longer just morally questionable, but also 
biologically base and crude. Soured Calvinist beliefs blend with a hegemonic knowledge system 
to produce what Overing refers to as a “Christian physiology” (2000); that is, in the Euro-
American discourse on laughter, we see the authority these institutions of faith and science bear 
over our understanding of the human body and its capacity for understanding. In our biosocial 
imagining of the body, and so of humanity, laughter’s place and role in western social universes 
are confined within the parameters of this model.  
However this is only one philosophy of a universal human behavior, reduced and 
simplified in ways that leave our understanding of laughter still confused and inconsistent. In 
response to this discourse, I reviewed the many ethnographic accounts of the production and 
enactment of social laughter and humor across human societies and collectives. An anthropology 
of laughter provides alternate frameworks to engage with laughter; from academics and from the 
gelotologies of natives themselves, we see how different social imaginings of humanity impact 
the discourse and practice of laughter. In this cross-cultural analysis of anthropological literature 
on different human societies, I illustrated how laughter’s meaning persists and changes 
throughout spaces and imaginaries. There exists no society where laughter does not exist; 
however some practice humor less than others, such as the Guayaki of Amazonia (Clastres, 
1998).  
From this review of literature on the subject of laughter in ethnography, we have learned 
that, ranging from daily social processes to intimate ritual practice, the production of laughter 
through joking, storytelling, clowning and mimesis is a cornerstone of sociality across collectives 
in humankind. In observing so-called primitive societies, we have learned that indigenous 
peoples laugh at puns and plays on words (Clastres, 2000: 132), as much as they do about 
scatological humor (Mitchell, 1992; Overing and Passes, 2000)— a phrase I which I have come 
to understand as what academics use when they’re not comfortable with saying “poop jokes.” 
Not only is humor consistently apparent throughout human societies, but it is also relatable in 
content and form; but it offers a distinct purpose and social significance per the place it is 
reserved among a people’s imaginary of emotions.  
Laughter’s role and place in the production of human sociality, as well as the mediation 
and evaluation of representations, is largely important to many human collectives, whether we all 
like to admit it or not; moreover, we can observe that laughter continues to be invaluable as a 
means of empowerment and healing in western societies as well (Klumbyté, 2014; Boyer and 
Yurchak, 2010; Van Blerkom and Miller, 1995). This capacity for humans to enact humor and 
laughter to accomplish these things socially is limited only by the imagining of laughter’s role 
and place within the human condition, or in other words, what laughter means to us.  
What this review of the biosocial discourse on the origins and purposes of laughter, as 
well as native gelotologies found in ethnography reveal to us, is that there is no really good way 
of defining laughter or answering big questions about it: laughter, this thing humans do by going 
“haha!” or “heehee!” sounds familiar to a person no matter what— but discerning the meaning of 
these “words” requires more than a philosophy regarding the subject. To define even a single 
instance of laughter, we need the symbolic context of both the joke teller and her audience, as 
well as the semantics and social meanings at work behind the joke itself.  
This is the system that mediates the production of humor dialectics whereby people laugh 
funny laughs— it is highly variable and, in social structures where politics and economies are 
dictated by ideas and symbols, it can be very powerful. But it is also not the only form of 
laughter that emerges from these analyses; there is also laughter produced by anxiety, as well as 
the uncontrollable sort of laughter that we make when we are being tickled; each of these 
continues to have important roles in producing sociality and relationality across human 
collectives (Clastres, 1998; Mitchell, 1992).  
What anthropology offers us, instead of a tight explanation of each of these forms of 
human laughter, is a framework through which we can understand these discussions about it at 
large. The discourses at hand range from the biosocial to the cosmological, from Estonia to 
Amazonia. And from what we’ve seen among all of these, while there are many questions left 
unanswered, it seems important to have a good sense of humor, and to not take oneself so 
seriously after all; because the funny thing about laughter is that in every effort we (as an entire 
human race) have made to reduce and explain dilemmas such as, why we should or should not 
laugh, or what purpose laughing has, we are met with contradictions and conflicts of interests, 
regardless of our side of the argument. No matter one’s outlook on laughter, and outlook on the 
human condition as well, laughter has never failed to stump us. We can see through these 
frameworks that laughter is socially complex and undoubtedly important to the tacit liminal 
processes through which we engage with and understand the world, but ultimately, perhaps the 
answer to these questions is the punchline that we will never quite “get.” 
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